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The Uninsured Drivers’ Agreement 2015 
as a Legitimate Source of Authority
James Marson* and Katy Ferris† 
A B S T R A C T
In the United Kingdom, motor vehicle insurance is governed by national and EU law. In 
respect of the EU requirement that member states establish a guarantee fund from which 
the victims of negligent uninsured or untraced drivers may obtain compensation, the United 
Kingdom entered into a series of agreements with the Motor Insurers’ Bureau (MIB). In 
2015, the MIB established the Uninsured Drivers’ Agreement (UDA). This agreement imple-
ments (with the Road Traffic Act 1988 and the Untraced Drivers’ Agreement 2003) aspects 
of the Motor Vehicle Insurance Directives (MVID). The UDA 2015 establishes clauses and 
procedural arrangements which, we argue, have largely removed legal certainty for policy-
holders and for the victims of negligent uninsured drivers. As such, the fundamental goals of 
the MVID and the free movement principles upon which they are based are undermined in 
the United Kingdom. This article offers a critique of the substantive breaches of the MVID 
through the UDA 2015’s exclusions and procedural arrangements and identifies the current 
state of unpredictability and uncertainty when the two sources of law are compared.
1 .  M O TO R  V E H I C L E  I N S U R A N C E  A N D  C E R TA I N T Y
The regulation of insurance for motor vehicles used on a road or other public place 
derives from national and EU law. Nationally, such insurance is governed through statu-
tory and extra-statutory provisions. The statute [the Road Traffic Act 1988 (RTA88)] 
at section 143 necessitates a minimum of third-party (liability) insurance is held by 
the owner of the vehicle to protect the innocent victim of a negligent insured and 
traced driver. The RTA88 also provides protection for the victims of uninsured drivers 
through, for example, enabling their claims directly against the policyholder’s insurers. 
However, in the event of the driver being uninsured, extra-statutory provisions1 take 
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† Senior Lecturer in Law, Law School, The University of Huddersfield, Huddersfield, UK. The authors would like to express 
their sincere thanks for comments on previous drafts of this paper from Nicholas Bevan, Michael Jefferson, and Robert 
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1 In 1937, the Cassel Committee (Cmnd 5528), having reviewed the motor insurance legislation, recommended that a defi-
ciency in the Acts be remedied through the creation of a central fund through which the victims of uninsured drivers would 
be able to recover damages. This led to the government entering into an agreement in 1945 with the insurance industry, 
through the created Motor Insurers’ Bureau (MIB), to undertake the central guarantee fund role. Thus, the MIB assumes 
the position of insurer for victims of accidents caused by uninsured and untraced drivers [protection for victims of untraced 
drivers (e.g. victims of a hit-and-run accident) did not become effective until 1969].
over. It is through the extra-statutory arrangements where a victim may recover com-
pensation in the event that either the at-fault driver’s insurer is not contractually nor 
statutorily liable to compensate the victim or that the individual causing the accident 
cannot be traced.
The Motor Vehicle Insurance Directives (MVID) is a collective term for a series of 
six EU directives2 relating to compulsory motor vehicle insurance. The aim, initially to 
facilitate the free movement principles of goods and people,3 extended latterly to reduc-
ing the negative effects on victims of accidents caused by uninsured4 and untraced5 
motor vehicle drivers. The directives continued, incorporating revisions and extensions 
facilitating protection to a wider remit of vehicles and places where accidents involving 
such vehicles took place (e.g. public and private land). A requirement of the MVID was 
for member states to establish a guarantee fund, a compensation fund, an information 
centre, and a central body to provide enhanced protection for injured victims of negli-
gent uninsured, untraced, or foreign motorists.6 Member states were entitled to desig-
nate these tasks to a central body and in the United Kingdom, through an agreement 
between the Secretary of State for Transport and the Motor Insurers’ Bureau (MIB), the 
MIB satisfied this aspect of the MVID and in so doing acts as an insurer of last resort.7 
The MIB’s agreements with the State consist of the Uninsured Drivers’ Agreement 
(UDA), most recently of 2015, and an Untraced Drivers’ Agreement (UtDA), estab-
lished in 2003 but subsequently amended.8
Given the relationship between the EU parent MVID and the national transposing 
provisions (incorporating the UDA 2015), the UDA 2015 is required to be in conform-
ity with the MVID and the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU). This provides the certainty necessary for citizens to understand the rights and 
obligations created through both sources. Hence both legal certainty and the principle 
2 (The First Directive) Council Directive 72/166/EEC on the approximation of the laws of member states relating to insurance 
against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles and to the enforcement of the obligation to insure against such liabil-
ity [1972] OJ L103/1; (the) Second Council Directive 84/5/EEC on the approximation of the laws of the member states relat-
ing to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles [1984] OJ LL8/17; (the) Third Council Directive 
90/232/EEC on the approximation of the laws of the member states relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of 
the use of motor vehicles [1990] OJ L129/33; Directive 2000/26/EC on the approximation of the laws of the member states 
relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles and amending Council Directives 73/239/EEC 
and 88/357/EEC (the Fourth Motor Insurance Directive) [2000] OJ L181/65; (the Fifth Directive) Directive 2005/14/EC 
amending Council Directives 72/166/EEC, 84/5/EEC, 88/357/EEC and 90/232/EEC and Directive 2000/26/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles [2005] 
OJ L149/14; and (the Sixth Directive) Directive 2009/103/EC relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use 
of motor vehicles, and the enforcement of the obligation to insure against such liability [2009] OJ L263/11.
3 Abolishing frontier checks on insurance certificates.
4 A driver who caused or contributed to the accident and who, at the time, held no valid policy of insurance.
5 A driver deemed responsible for the accident and who leaves the scene without identifying him/herself and cannot be 
traced.
6 This ‘green card scheme’ applies to accidents caused through the negligent driving of foreign motorists. The MIB may resolve 
the victim’s claim for damages and he/she is not then required to communicate with the foreign insurer.
7 Every insurer operating a business incorporating the underwriting of compulsory motor insurance is required to be a mem-
ber of the MIB (RTA88, sections 95, 143, and 145(2)).
8 Whilst the MIB and the government develop a new UtDA to replace the 2003 agreement, it was amended at the same 
time as the UDA 2015. Similar provisions, as per the UDA 2015, in respect of exclusions for passengers with constructive 
knowledge, and what constitutes a subrogated claim have been applied. This provides a consistent approach to both matters 
between the two agreements.
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of justice (a fellow pillar of the rule of law) are required to be present in the legal issu-
ance of the UDA 2015 and in its application.
The CJEU9 has confirmed that legal certainty10 is a fundamental principle of EU law 
(even though it does not appear explicitly in the Treaties).11 Whilst a very broad concept, 
in essence it imposes upon member states a requirement for transparency, precision, sta-
bility, and predictability in law-making.12 Legal certainty enables citizens to understand, 
in advance, the consequences that follow their conduct.13 It provides governance, identi-
fies limitations, and imposes order on permissible actions including rule-making and 
law-applying activities.14 This lends itself to the long and often complex negotiation, and 
the planning and administration, of the agreements concluded between the Secretary of 
State and the MIB. However, it is in both the drafting and in the judicial interpretation of 
the agreement with the parent MVID (at least until the United Kingdom determines if 
and on what basis it leaves the EU) where problems of certainty, and justice, exist.
2 .  T H E  U D A  1 9 9 9  A N D  2 0 1 5 :  H I S TO R Y  R E P E AT I N G  I T S E L F ?
In the intervening 16 years between the previous UDA (concluded in 1999) and the 
current agreement, jurisprudence from national and EU law, along with three further 
directives,15 had evolved and clarified much of the law relating to motor vehicle insur-
ance. Hence, a textual reading of the UDA 1999 contained erroneous and/or mislead-
ing information, despite the publication of Supplemental Guidance Notes from 15 
April 2002 which were designed to alleviate the most severe criticisms.16
The UDA 2015 aimed to simplify many of the previous rules surrounding claims 
to the MIB. The UDA 1999 was widely disliked and broadly criticized due to the pro-
cedural rules applied17 (often placing an unfair burden on claimants) and which, if not 
9 See Case C-236/95 Commission v.  Hellenic Republic [1996] ECLI:EU:C:1996:341 where the European Court of Justice 
(now the CJEU) remarked: ‘the Court has consistently held that it is particularly important, in order to satisfy the require-
ment for legal certainty, that individuals should have the benefit of a clear and precise legal situation enabling them to ascer-
tain the full extent of their rights and, where appropriate, to rely on them before the national courts (see to this effect Case 
29/84 Commission v Germany [1985] ECR 1661, paragraph 23, Case 363/85 Commission v Italy [1987] ECR 1733, para-
graph 7, and C-59/89 Commission v Germany [1991] ECR I-2607, paragraph 18).’ at [13].
10 A term first used by the CJEU in Cases 42, 49/59 Société nouvelle des usines de Pontlieue - Aciéries du Temple (S.N.U.P.A.T.) 
v. High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community [1961] ECR 53.
11 It is a principle common to the legal systems of the member states—see J Temple Lang ‘Legal Certainty and Legitimate 
Expectation as General Principles of Community Law’ in U Bernitz and J Nergelius (eds) General Principles of European 
Community Law (Kluwer The Hague 2000), 163. Legal certainty is enshrined in Art. 49 of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union, 2000/C 364/01.
12 See cases including Case 70/83 Kloppenburg v.  Finanzamt Leer [1984] ECR 1075 at 1086; Case 169/80 Administration 
des Douanes v.  Société Anonyme Gondrand Freres and Societe anonyme Garancini [1981] ECR 1931; Case C-182/03 and 
C-217/03 Belgium and Forum 187 v. Commission [2006] ECR I-5479 at [69]; and Case C-67/09 P Nuova Agricast and Cofra 
v. Commission [2010] ECR I-09811 at [77].
13 T Tridimas The General Principles of EU Law (2nd edn Oxford University Press Oxford 2006), 242.
14 See, for instance, Bertelsmann Stiftung ‘2014 Rule of Law Report Legal Certainty, Judicial Review, Appointment of Justices, 
Corruption Prevention’ Sustainable Governance Indicators.
15 The fourth, fifth and sixth MVID.
16 See, e.g., commentary published in The Law Society Gazette <http://www.lawgazette.co.uk/news/motor-insurers-bureau-
trouble-ahead/38186.fullarticle> (accessed 28 August 2016).
17 Evidenced in cll. 7 (failure to use the MIB’s own application form), 9 (failure to provide the MIB with ‘proper notice’ of pro-
ceedings), 10 and 11 (failure to inform the MIB within seven days with details of various developments/additional informa-
tion as the MIB may reasonably require), and 13 (failure to request insurance information from the defendant driver/failing 
to use all reasonable endeavours to obtain the information/report the failure to provide that information to the police).
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complied with, permitted the MIB to escape liability. The 2015 UDA removed many of 
these problems by enabling the MIB to be joined as a party to the action for the recov-
ery of losses from the outset [clause 13(1)].18 This provided the MIB with adequate 
notice of proceedings,19 whilst also including a requirement for the claimant to issue the 
MIB with such information as it may reasonably require.
The UDA 1999 (in)famously included a ‘crime exception’ where the MIB was 
allowed to exclude its liability to compensate claimants in the event that they know-
ingly allowed themselves to be carried in vehicles which: have been stolen or unlawfully 
taken,20 are uninsured, are used in the furtherance of a crime, or are used to avoid lawful 
apprehension. The latter two exclusions were not permitted in EU law although it took 
proceedings in state liability in Delaney v. Secretary of State for Transport [2015]21 for the 
exclusion to be disapplied and removed in the 2015 UDA.
The UDA 1999 included evidential ‘presumptions’ regarding the knowledge held by 
the claimant which, following the Lords’ ruling in White v. White [2001],22 brought the 
definition in line with that used in RTA88 sections 143(3) and 151(4). Unfortunately, 
this interpretation and that used in RTA88 section 151(4) continues to amount to a 
breach of EU law. The presumption relates to imputed knowledge which, to comply 
with the MVID, requires proof of the knowledge held by the claimant/third party 
rather than perceived or subsequent knowledge or that the claimant ‘turned a blind eye’ 
to such evidence.23 The UDA 2015 replaces the phraseology ‘ought to have known’ with 
‘had reason to believe’ which in practical application will have little impact on the prob-
lems which such constructive knowledge creates between national and EU law. The 
UDA 2015 does at least remove the previous drafting error contained in UDA 1999 
where it was the knowledge of the claimant that was applied, rather than the knowledge 
held of a passenger who died in the incident.24
Clause 9 of the UDA 2015 excludes the MIB from liability for terrorist acts involv-
ing motor vehicles. This is a new inclusion compared with the UDA 1999, although it 
does appear in the UtDA 2003. It has been questioned whether the clause now clarifies 
matters related to the use of vehicle for terrorism-related purposes, whether it follows 
an interpretation restricting the liability of the MIB consistently with the RTA88,25 or 
where the inclusion of the word ‘use’ of a vehicle restricts even the direct application of 
a vehicle for terrorist purposes (e.g. as a car bomb). However, we argue later that this 
inclusion is illegal in the blanket use of the clause and will likely be removed by the 
courts/a revised UDA from the MIB.
Ultimately, the UDA 2015 has simplified several aspects of the agreement and its use. 
It is approximately half the length of the 1999 agreement, and this is reflected also in 
the shortened guidance notes accompanying the UDA 2015 compared with the UDA 
1999. Many of the most unjust exclusions included in the UDA 1999 have also been 
18 The MIB had already possessed this right following Gurtner v. Circuit and the MIB [1968] 2 QB 587.
19 And hence the necessary procedural documents and court notices at the same time as the defendant receives these.
20 A similar exclusion applies in RTA88 151(4).
21 Delaney v. Secretary of State for Transport [2015] 3 All ER 329.
22 White v. White [2001] UKHL 9.
23 See White v. White [2001] UKHL 9, per Lord Scott at [53].
24 Phillips v. Rafiq and the MIB [2007] 3 All ER 382.
25 AXN and others v. Worboys and Inceptum Insurance Co Ltd [2013] Lloyd’s Rep IR 207.
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removed in the UDA 2015. There are areas of motor vehicle insurance law where the 
United Kingdom exceeds the minimum standards required at EU law. However, this is 
not to say that the statutory law or the UDA 2015 complies with EU law in its entirety. 
This article presents some of the current problems which exist in the exclusions and 
procedural arrangements of the UDA 2015 (and which either were not rectified from 
the UDA 1999 or have introduced new infringements).
3 .  U D A  E X C L U S I O N S
Clearly, and specifically relevant to EU laws and their national transposing meas-
ures, legislative action and procedural rules which distort either a subject within 
the legislative instrument or the provisions between laws should be forestalled.26 
The UDA 2015, in clauses 4–10, outlines a series of exceptions to the MIB’s liability. 
In this latest agreement, and despite the implications of Vnuk27 and historic (and in 
places continued) inconsistencies between EU and national law,28 the Department 
for Transport seems to be ignoring29 the lessons issued following successful enforce-
ment actions30 and to heed advice regarding compliance between the sources of 
law.31
(A) Vehicles Requiring No Insurance
Article 3 of the Sixth MVID requires the compulsory insurance of vehicles in mem-
ber states. They are, subject to Article 5, to take all appropriate measures to ensure 
that civil liability in respect of the use of vehicles normally based in their territory is 
covered by insurance. In relation to accidents occurring in the United Kingdom, the 
MIB’s potential liability only extends to losses arising from accidents where there 
ought to have been insurance in place.32 In UDA 2015 clause 5,33 the MIB is not 
liable for any claim ‘arising out of the use of a vehicle which is not required to be 
covered by a contract of insurance34 unless the use is in fact covered by a contract 
of insurance.’ In its supplementary guidance notes, local authorities, the National 
Health Service, and the police are examples of public bodies that will meet claims 
arising from the use of vehicles in their ownership or possession and as such do 
26 Thus legal certainty being framed as an epistemic problem.
27 Case C-162/13 Damijan Vnuk v. Zavarovalnica Triglav [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:2146. Note that, as detailed on the MIB’s 
website on 9 June 2016, the EC Commission is undertaking a review of Directive 2009/103/EC in light of the Vnuk ruling.
28 Leading to amendment, replacement or the agreements being supplemented, predominantly with the intention to bring the 
framework in to line with EU law [the UDA 1999 was amended on 7 November 2008, essentially replaced (in respect of 
future incidents) on 3 July 2015, and the UtDA 2008 has been amended five times, on 30 December 2008, 15 April 2011, 30 
April 2013, 8 June 2015, and 3 July 2015].
29 See the correspondence received from the Department for Transport by Nicholas Bevan: <http://nicholasbevan.blogspot.
co.uk/search?updated-min=2015-01-01T00:00:00Z&updated-max=2016-01-01T00:00:00Z&max-results=31> (accessed 
23 June 2016).
30 Delaney v. Secretary of State for Transport [2014] EWHC 1785 (QB) and Delaney v. Secretary of State for Transport [2015] 
EWCA Civ 172.
31 Nicholas Bevan has provided information and detailed accounts to both the UK Government and the EU Commission 
regarding the infractions of the law contained in the RTA88 and the UDA 2015 and UtDA 2003 (and their previous 
incarnations).
32 See Pt VI RTA88.
33 Similar provisions were included in the UDA 1999 cll. 6.1(a) and (b).
34 per RTA88 section 144.
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not require insurance cover. Therefore, the MIB is not liable for any judgment aris-
ing out of the use of such vehicles unless the vehicle in question is in fact covered 
by insurance. In such circumstances, the MIB’s obligation arises where the ‘insurer’ 
does not satisfy the judgment. The result of clause 5 is that a victim of an unauthor-
ized driver will be unable to recover compensation. This is in contrast to the require-
ments established in the Sixth MVID (the derogation from the obligation in respect 
of compulsory insurance of vehicles).35 Clause 5 breaches the MVID by allowing 
the guarantee fund body to avoid liability to victims in the event of injury caused by 
uninsured vehicles.
(B) Deducting Compensation Payments
Clause 6 of the UDA 2015 is broader in scope than the previous clause contained in 
the 1999 Agreement (clause 17).36 In clause 6, the MIB is provided with authority 
to avoid liability or to deduct the payments a victim of an uninsured driver would be 
entitled to receive through accident insurance payments/compensation (subject to 
certain exclusions). These exclusions, relating to payments from the Criminal Injuries 
Compensation Authority and an employer’s non-insured refundable advance, and par-
agraph 3 which continues by penalizing a victim for a failure to use (or to claim within 
time) from his own insurance, each act contrary to the rights a victim has at common 
law.37 It has been held38 that such a distinction between the MIB agreements and the 
common law in the protection of victims is unlawful. In McCall v. Poulton,39 the Court 
of Appeal was faced with a taxi driver who, having been the victim of the negligent 
driving of Poulton, required a replacement vehicle and entered into an agreement with 
a company, Helphire. It transpired that Poulton was an uninsured driver and McCall, 
recovering compensation from the MIB for his personal injury and the damage to his 
property, was refused compensation for his hire charges. The UDA 1999 (applicable 
at the time) did not extend to covering subrogation claims40 and the issue was not 
resolved due to the case being settled prior to a reference to the CJEU. Subrogation is 
a mechanism where motor vehicle insurers may recover monies paid in claims to their 
policyholders. It provides to the insurer a legal right to make a payment that is owed by 
another party (here the other driver or his insurance company). This process is impor-
tant as often fault is an issue in motor vehicle accidents yet responsibility may not be 
determined until some time after the event. The policyholder may not be able to wait 
until this process is concluded before payments are made. His insurer will make pay-
ments to the policyholder and will seek recovery of these through the at-fault driver (or 
insurer where available). The policyholder claimant will be required to cooperate with 
the insurer in its pursuit of recovery of these costs and will be prevented in waiving the 
35 Art. 5.
36 UDA 1999 cl. 17 allowed the MIB to deduct from a claimant’s compensatory entitlement sums received from the 
Policyholders Protection Board (no longer applicable); an insurer under an agreement or other arrangement; and from any 
other source where the sums were paid in respect of injury loss or damage claimed in the proceedings. These exceed the 
permissible deductions outlined in MVID Art. 10(1).
37 Under the general rules of quantum.
38 White v. White [2001] UKHL 9 at [34].
39 [2008] EWCA Civ 1263.
40 Cl. 6(1)(c).
Page 6 of 14 • The Uninsured Drivers’ Agreement 2015
other driver’s responsibility for the accident. The UDA 1999 incorporated exclusions 
to the MIB’s liability regarding subrogated claims. Issues relating to what constitutes a 
subrogated claim, and hence which claims the MIB was obliged to meet, were particu-
larly problematic and subject to litigation. The UDA 2015 clause 6(1) provides that 
subrogated claims are excluded, as are the claims of individuals who have other sources 
of redress available (e.g. those with comprehensive insurance cover).
The sixth MVID does allow for member states (via their guarantee fund body) to 
make deductions from a victim’s compensation award. In Article 10, the obligation on 
the MIB is construed without prejudice for the member state ‘to regard compensa-
tion by… other insurers or social security bodies required to compensate the victim in 
respect of the same accident.’ This paragraph is included to ensure that member states 
would not be placed in a position to offer double-compensation for a victim who has, 
for example, received payment through a state-run benefits system or who may have 
recovered funds through a compensation scheme. The MVID continues to require 
member states to provide full compensation for victims and does not permit subroga-
tion against victims of motor vehicle accidents. At paragraph 2, Article 10 permits the 
MIB to ‘exclude the payment of compensation… in respect of persons who voluntarily 
entered the vehicle which caused the damage or injury when the body can prove that 
they knew it was uninsured.’ Clause 6 UDA 2015 exceeds this limitation and fails to 
adhere to both the MVID and the EU’s equivalence principle.
(C) Constructive Knowledge of an Uninsured Vehicle
Clause 7 allows the MIB to avoid liability for damage to vehicles where, at the time of 
the damage being caused, there was no contract of insurance in force for the use of the 
vehicle and the claimant knew or ought to have reason to believe this was the case. The 
MVID specifically outlaw such an exclusion.
Clause 8 applies to situations where the victim is a passenger in a vehicle, the driver 
is responsible for the accident, and the victim attempts to claim against the driver/any-
one else who might be responsible for the driver’s use of the vehicle. Here, the MIB 
is not liable for any claim, or any part of a claim, in respect of a relevant liability by a 
claimant who, at the time of the use giving rise to that liability, was voluntarily allowing 
himself to be a passenger in the vehicle. Further, this applies where: either before the start 
of the claimant’s journey in the vehicle or after its start if the victim could reasonably be 
expected to have alighted from it, [he] knew or had reason to believe that (i) the vehicle 
had been stolen or unlawfully taken or (ii) the vehicle was being used without there 
being in force a contract of insurance complying with the RTA88. The areas of conten-
tion are identified in italics.
Here, the legal decision making of the United Kingdom in relation to the MVID (the 
procedural component) and the attainment of a consistent and correct transposition of 
the directives and the obligation on member states to follow EU law (the rational com-
ponent) are absent and certainty is put at risk. Both clauses 7 and 8 maintain a phraseol-
ogy used in previous incarnations of the UDA41 regarding the victim’s knowledge (or 
where he had reason to believe) that no (effective) insurance was in place covering the 
vehicle’s use at the time of the accident. Changes have been made to the wording from 
41 Cl. 6 UDA 1999.
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‘ought to have known’42 to ‘had reason to believe’. Further, an acknowledgment of the rul-
ing and construction of the UDA and the RTA88 sections 143(3) and 151(4) in White 
v. White43 has also been incorporated. Finally, the UDA 2015 removed the EU-offending 
‘crime exemption’44 of the MIB to victims who had knowingly allowed themselves to be 
carried in vehicles which were used in the furtherance of a crime. Despite these changes, 
it remains that the UDA 2015 is in breach of the MVID. MVID Article 10(2) permits 
the exclusion of liability in relation to persons who the member state (or the MIB in the 
United Kingdom) can prove/knew the vehicle in which they were travelling was unin-
sured. In White v. White,45 the House of Lords construed actual knowledge to include 
purposefully not enquiring about the status of the insurance when the victim suspected 
insurance cover was not in place/effective, and where the victim ‘turned a blind eye’46 to 
the fact of no insurance cover, but even this extension does not fulfil the requirements 
of the MVID as there is no equivalent provision in the directives. Clause 8 continues to 
impose constructive knowledge where the victim had no knowledge having entered the 
vehicle and subsequently discovers it is stolen or without the required insurance cover.
(D) The Terrorism Exclusion
Clause 9 of the UDA 2015 is a relatively succinct inclusion which provides:
[The] MIB is not liable for any claim, or any part of a claim, where the death, 
bodily injury or damage to property was caused by, or in the course of, an act of 
terrorism within the meaning of s. 1 of the Terrorism Act (TA) 2000.47
This ‘terrorism exclusion’ clause operates to void the MIB of liability in those specific cir-
cumstances and is a clause which began life in UtDA 2003 clause 5.1(g). The UDA 2015 
clause refers to the definition as provided by the TA 2000 which is where potential prob-
lems exist.48 It is possible that the drafters of the agreement made reference to the TA 2000 
section 1 merely because it contains a broadly used definition of terrorism49 or due to its 
previous use in another of the MIB’s agreements. The opening paragraph of section 1 reads:
(1) In this Act “terrorism” means the use or threat of action where—
 (a) the action falls within subsection (2),50
42 UDA 1999.
43 White v. White [2001] UKHL 9.
44 Delaney v. Secretary of State [2015] EWCA Civ 172.
45 White v. White [2001] UKHL 9.
46 At [34].
47 Although the use of such a definition is not limited to the UDA 2015, see, for instance, the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security 
Act 2001 section 74; the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 section 15; and the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 
2006 section 54.
48 For a critical assessment of the Terrorism Act (TA) 2000 and broader aspects of human rights, see C Gearty ‘Terrorism and 
Human Rights: A Case Study in Impending Legal Realities’ [1999] Legal Studies 19, 367.
49 The member states of the United Nations, as identified in a report published in 1988 (‘Political Terrorism’ Schmidt and 
Youngman) collectively had 109 different definitions.
50 Subsection 2 refers to actions including serious violence; serious damage to property; serious danger to health or public 
safety; endangering another person’s life [which, according to the Court of Appeal in David Miranda v. Secretary of State for 
the Home Department [2016] EWCA Civ 6 involves intent or recklessness on the part of the individual (para. 55)] or action 
which is designed seriously to interfere/disrupt an electronic system.
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(b)  the use or threat is designed to influence51 the government [or an interna-
tional governmental organisation] or to intimidate the public or a section 
of the public, and
(c)  the use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious, 
racial or ideological cause.
Beyond the debate regarding whether the term terrorism should be defined broadly 
or tightly,52 it is probable that this clause of the agreement was created with the view 
of a vehicle being used as a weapon53 and/or car bomb54 and would consequently, in 
accordance with EU law, not constitute a normal use of a vehicle and therefore result 
in no insurance being held.55 However, the agreement does not provide this limitation. 
By using the TA 2000 section 1, the case law establishing the scope and effect of the Act 
is applicable. It is possible that a consequence of clause 9 using the TA 2000 is that in 
a situation where, for example, an individual who is a victim of a road traffic accident 
caused by an uninsured driver fleeing the scene following the use or threat of action, 
made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious, racial, or ideological cause, 
would not be able to rely on the MIB as insurer of last resort. Evidently, terrorism may 
constitute racism, nationalism, separatism, extremist ideology, religious fundamental-
ism (and so on). It may also constitute single-issue campaigns.56 Whilst mercifully rare 
in the United Kingdom, the United States has been subject to interested groups joining 
and utilizing terrorist methods. Challenges in this way regarding animal rights, environ-
mental movements, and anti-abortionist movements (as forms of single-issue extrem-
ism) have led to laboratories and clinics being bombed and the individuals working in 
these industries being attacked and in some instances killed.57 Therefore, a third-party 
victim of a road traffic accident caused by an uninsured driver of a car fleeing the scene 
following his murder of a nurse employed at an abortion clinic/an arsonist having 
killed victims employed at an anti-genetically modified crop facility, for example, may 
find, under its current reading, that clause 9 UDA 2015 excludes the MIB from liability. 
Victims of other non-terrorism offences committed in similar ways would, however, 
be protected. Hence the third-party victim of a road traffic accident caused by an unin-
sured driver of a car fleeing the scene following his murder of a clerk during his bank 
51 Despite Lord Carlile’s efforts to have the term changed to ‘intimidate’—The Definition of Terrorism (Cm 7052, 2007), para. 
86(11).
52 Substantial debate, prior to the enactment of the TA 2000 and following its commencement, has demonstrated concerns 
over the nature of its definition of terrorism and what may constitute an act of terrorism. It is, however, not the purpose of 
this article to critique the wider implications of the use of this definition in the fight against terrorism.
53 See Seddon v. Binions [1978] RTR 163 for the use of a vehicle to intentionally injure a person rather than being indicative of 
an act of terror for the purposes of TA 2000 section 1.
54 As has been used in mainland Britain on several occasions by organizations including (allegedly) the Real IRA: <http://
news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/1201273.stm> (accessed 4 March 2001).
55 The TA 2000 definition of terrorism is itself questionable as to its appropriateness for the various purposes to which it is 
applied—see C Walker Terrorism and the Law (OUP Oxford 2011).
56 Indeed, in its consultation paper, the Government had identified three different forms of terrorism—Irish terrorism; inter-
national terrorism; and domestic terrorism (which includes Irish terrorism but also animal rights, environmentalist and 
anti-abortion activists). See Cm 4178, Legislation against Terrorism, paras 2.2 and 2.6.
57 See Home Office and Northern Ireland Office Legislation Against Terrorism. A  Consultation Paper, Cm 4178 (Stationery 
Office London 1998) para. 3.12.
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robbery would be able to claim from the MIB according to the UDA 2015.58 Public 
policy would be remiss to allow such a distinction to exist as, if protection here is to be 
afforded to the third-party victim, it surely makes no difference to him what purpose 
(lawful, unlawful, terrorism-related or otherwise) the driver was involved with when 
the victim was injured.
It remains possible, as this clause has yet to be tested in court, that the interpretation 
of ‘… in the course of…’ may follow that used in maritime insurance law. Similarities 
exist between this rule and the loss or damage to insured property due to the perils of 
piracy. Where this area of law may be useful in respect of the UDA’s terrorism exclu-
sion clause is in the interpretation of the use of violence when making good an escape 
following the actual insurable loss having occurred. Therefore, in the case of piracy, 
damage or loss is not deemed a consequence of piracy when it occurs during an escape.59 
Hence, the judiciary could follow a similar line of reasoning to restrict the attribution 
of loss caused by a driver following his act of terror (and hence the terrorist act has been 
completed and any accident caused during his motor vehicle-based escape would not 
be considered to have occurred ‘… in the course of…’ such action). However, irrespec-
tive of whether the application of clause 9 follows the hypothetical example as provided 
above or that available in another strand of insurance law, a plausible, and indeed unfor-
tunately more likely scenario, is where motor vehicles are used as weapons in terror-
ist attacks. As way of examples, France has been subject to vehicular terrorist attacks 
on four occasions between 2014 and 2016; such attacks have been relatively common 
in Israel (seven attacks between 2008 and 2014) and even in the United Kingdom, in 
2013 a car was used in the (terrorist-based) murder of Fusilier Lee Rigby. It is a breach 
of the MVID to continue the terrorism exclusion.
Had the MIB wished to protect itself against liability for genuine acts of terrorism, 
it could have used, for instance, the definition provided in the Reinsurance (Acts of 
Terrorism) Act 1993 section 2(2) which avoids the negative consequences of the TA 
2000 section 1 with regards public intimidation (if not directed to the specified ends 
identified) and the highly problematic element of acts/threats of acts which advance 
a political, religious, racial, or ideological cause. It would also have been better served 
to have not used a definition of terrorism which has been the subject of dispute and 
controversy prior to its enactment. In relation to EU jurisprudence, the CJEU in Vnuk60 
ruled, prior to the establishment of the UDA 2015 (and incredulously in relation to the 
public commentary on the case and its implications, the MIB did not take its effects 
into consideration) that vehicles must be used for their intended purpose. Beyond the 
scope of this would constitute some form of misuse and the MVID would not have effect 
or impose compulsory third-party insurance invoking national bodies such as the MIB. 
There was thus no requirement or useful function played by the inclusion of clause 9, 
yet despite its redundancy, it is present and is a breach of EU law. The measure has not 
been tested and is likely to be rejected in judicial review or through further legislative 
action, yet the MIB is, at the time of writing, silent on the issue, and the UDA 2015 and 
58 Similar arguments, when considering the implications of removing the motive element of the definition of terrorism have 
been raised in D Anderson ‘Shielding the Compass: How to Fight Terrorism Without Defeating the Law’ [2013] European 
Human Rights Law Review 3, 233, 243.
59 Athens Maritime Enterprises Corp v. Hellenic Mutual War Risks Assn (Bermuda) Ltd (The Andreas Lemos) [1983] QB 647.
60 Case C-162/13 Damijan Vnuk v. Zavarovalnica Triglav [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:2146.
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the supplementary information provided on the MIB’s website remains unaltered. Legal 
certainty is lacking with this provision despite knowledge by the government that clause 
9, in its current form, is illegal. Subjects to this rule are entitled to have ascertained facts 
to enable their compliance with the law, and in the event of silence on the matter, the 
principles of temporal law will be applied. Hence, in the absence of clear instruction to 
the contrary, a legal rule has immediate application. Neither the MIB or the government 
has informed subjects to the law of the potential illegality of clause 9 or whether it will be 
applied, be modified when tested in court, or be removed via a new agreement.
4 .  P R O C E D U R A L  A N O M A L I E S
The victim of an uninsured driver is required to follow the procedural rules established 
in the MIB Agreements if he is to be successful in recovering compensation from this 
body. Road users and pedestrians in the United Kingdom are entitled to clear guid-
ance regarding not only their rights in relation to compulsory insurance provisions but 
also the circumstances and extent to which public authorities may interfere with these 
rights. The imposition of procedural rules which are deployed, for instance, in arbitrary 
forms, negatively impact on the attainment of legal certainty, justice, and reasonable-
ness. Examples exist of irrationality in the application of the procedural rules under-
lying the UDA 2015, and here we identify some of the more serious (although it is 
beyond the scope of this article to provide an exhaustive examination of all the failures 
of transposition within the UDA 2015). The inclusion of such procedural rules, like the 
exclusion clauses outlined above, are not only incorrect in their scope but also unsus-
tainable in relation to the level of the infraction committed to the victim and when 
compared with the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 which contain no similar application of 
such harsh tests or strike-out policies.
(A) Compulsory Arbitration and Limited Appeals
Under the UDA 1999, the MIB was to cause any application for a payment under the 
agreement to be investigated and decide whether to make an award.61 Following the 
decision and the reasoned reply regarding the application, the applicant could decide to 
accept and be paid the award62 or he could appeal to an arbitrator.63 A significant factor 
relating to the previous arbitration process was that, under the general rules on arbitra-
tion laid down by the Arbitration Act 1996, the victim may, in certain cases, appeal 
against the award to the High Court of Justice. The right of appeal is, of course, subject 
to procedural and substantive rules; however, it is automatically available to a victim 
alleging serious irregularity64 which affects the arbitration. Further, the right of appeal 
is also available to the victim (subject to the granting of leave of the High Court) in the 
event of the victim’s allegation of an infringement of a rule of law or the conclusion of a 
decision which no arbitrator could have reasonably reached based on the evidence con-
sidered.65 Having obtained leave from the competent court, subsequent appeals could 
61 Cl. 7. This is made in spite of the fact that clearly the MIB is not a court—see Case C-63/01 Evans v. Secretary of State for 
Transport and the MIB [2003] ECR I-14492 at [48].
62 Cll. 9 and 10.
63 Cl. 11.
64 Arbitration Act 1996 section 68.
65 See Case C-63/01 Evans v. Secretary of State for Transport and the MIB [2003] ECR I-14492 at [51].
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be made to the Court of Appeal and then to the House of Lords (now Supreme Court). 
On the basis of this process, and the balance it afforded between costs and speed of 
decision making, the result was that this system did not render it practically impos-
sible or excessively difficult to exercise the right to compensation conferred on victims 
of damage or injury caused by unidentified or insufficiently insured vehicles. Hence, 
in accordance with the Second MVID, the arbitration process and decision making of 
awards complied (held the CJEU in Evans) with the principle of effectiveness and pro-
vided the protection to victims as required by that directive.66
The CJEU’s ruling in Evans is unfortunate in this regard and suggests that scrutiny 
of the effects and consequences of these procedural rules was not undertaken or was 
at least accepted on face value. The UDA 1999 enabled the MIB to determine whether 
to deny to a victim any compensation payment where he failed to issue to the MIB ‘… 
such information about the relevant proceedings and… such documents as MIB may 
reasonably require.’67 Similar provisions are not included in the MVID or the RTA88, 
and a disparity exists between these rules and those available in the civil law (and the 
protections present therein through rules of evidence and even extending to the rule of 
law and the determination of legal rules to be determined by law, not discretion).
One of the more insidious inclusions in the 2015 UDA is in clause 17. Any dispute as 
to the reasonableness of MIB’s requirements under clauses 12 or 14, and which cannot 
be resolved by agreement, must be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Secretary 
of State following a request from either MIB or the claimant. The clause establishes the 
procedure to be adopted which involves the MIB sending to the appointed arbitrator 
and to the claimant, in writing, the reasons for the referral together with its views on 
the dispute. The claimant may thereafter (within 28 days) provide to MIB and to the 
arbitrator in writing any further specific observations he wishes to make in relation to 
the dispute. The arbitrator will then decide the dispute based solely upon the written 
submissions before him and his written decision will be final.
On face value, this may not appear particularly noteworthy, until sub-clause 3 is con-
sidered. Here, the arbitrator determines disputes on the basis of written submissions 
and his decision is final. There is no scope for appeal to higher courts, or a review of 
decisions other than in those written forms. Opportunity for cross- or direct exami-
nation of witnesses is lost. It also appears that due to the restrictions imposed on the 
arbitrator, it may preclude the consideration of EU law, and details are lacking as to the 
procedure of the appeal and on what bases it must be made and by whom. The claimant, 
who by including the MIB in proceedings is doing so because of the lack of available 
damages from the tortfeasor and is seeking redress from the insurer of last resort, has 
legal protections available in the national legal system denied to him.
The inclusion of a compulsory arbitration element to the resolution of disputes 
between the victim and the MIB is sufficient to breach the legal certainty of EU law. 
Even given the latitude issued to member states as to their procedural measures and the 
application of these, such an imposition renders it impossible for an effective review of 
the decision of the arbitrator. That the arbitrator is appointed by the MIB further com-
pounds this error, despite their fee being paid by the MIB. A further significant problem 
66 Ibid at [54] and [58].
67 Cll. 7(1)(b) and (c).
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with the present system of MIB appeals is the lack of appeals from an arbitrator on 
points of fact or in the exercise of his discretion. Given the nature of motor vehicle 
insurance claims, these are the very issues likely to be at stake in an UDA arbitration. It 
is questionable whether transferring these matters to a person appointed by the MIB 
rather than the State is acceptable.
Victims of a negligent uninsured driver are entitled to seek compensation from the 
MIB, they have not transferred rights to another body, they have not waived their rights 
to due legal process by their need to seek compensation from the state’s guaranteed 
fund, and the agreements concluded between the state and their preferred provider of 
insurance protection do not entitle either party to disregard the fundamental require-
ments of effectiveness and equivalence of EU law.68
Certainty and non-arbitrariness may be achieved where the law’s procedural and 
rational components are secured. The forms of decision making in the application of 
the arbitration process are not consistent with the rights of claimants outside of this 
narrow field (i.e. those available to claimants under the common law). The propensity 
for procedural irrationality in the absence of review mechanisms and in the (in)ability 
to examine and challenge evidence and the underlying rationale for awards is prevalent. 
The result of the imposition of a system of compulsory arbitration must be unreason-
able at common law and under the MVID.
5 .  E Q U I VA L E N C E  A N D  E F F E C T I V E N E S S
The UDA 2015 and UtDA 2003 (as amended) each consist of deficiencies which 
breach EU law and would enable enforcement mechanisms to be pursued. This is a 
matter of subsidiarity and consequently how the law is actually enforced is a matter for 
the state to determine in relation to the principles of effectiveness and equivalence.69 
This has caused problems in the application of the MIB agreements (particularly so the 
UtDA 2003) as there exists no obvious comparable civil procedure by which to test the 
equivalence criterion.70 Conversely, the EU parent MVID and its imposition of obliga-
tions on the state is a matter of EU law and the underlying principle applicable here is 
its ability to be invoked in domestic courts. Hence, every citizen in the member state 
has the guaranteed protection of his rights, and this applies regardless of the choice of 
body/procedural route the state wishes to adopt. The result is that where the claimant 
applies to the MIB for redress, seeking to obtain an enforcement against it through use 
of the MVID, and this fails (either due to the absolute refusal of the MIB to entertain 
such an argument or because an appeal court holds the MIB as not satisfying the crite-
ria as an ‘emanation of the state’),71 the fact that the claimant has sought to invoke EU 
rights obliges that court to give effect to the MVID due to the primacy of EU norms. 
68 As articulated in Case 33/76 Rewe-Zentralfinanz eG and Rewe-Zentral AG v. Landwirtschaftskammer für das Saarland [1976] 
ECR 1989 at [5].
69 Case C-144/04 Werner Mangold v. Rüdiger Helm [2005] ECR I-9981.
70 See, for instance, the (unsuccessful) arguments presented and challenges made to the national procedural arrangements in 
relation to the UtDA 2003 in Carswell v. Secretary of State for Transport and MIB [2010] EWHC 3230 (QB) on the basis of 
the impossibility of excessive difficulty for the claimant to present a claim.
71 See J Marson, K Ferris, and A Nicholson ‘Irreconcilable Differences? The Road Traffic Act and the European Motor Vehicle 
Insurance Directives’ [2017] Journal of Business Law 1, 51.
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This will manifest itself in a change in either the obligations between the MIB and the 
Secretary of State or a direct changing of the agreement itself.72
Engaging with public policy on the matter is necessary to raise awareness73 and to 
compel a review of the UDA 2015. Further, pending these required changes, it is neces-
sary to inform educators and lawyers74 in exercising the range of tools available through 
domestic enforcement mechanisms.
6 .  C O N C L U S I O N S
The legitimacy of the MIB UDA 2015 as a source of authority is questionable. There 
exist several substantive and procedural anomalies within the agreement which lead 
to uncertainty in its content and application and provide inconsistencies between the 
national law and the EU parent directives. Both the substantive and procedural require-
ments articulated in the UDA 2015 do not operate in the abstract, nor are their criteria 
trivial or without consequence. They impact on individuals and the lack of an effective 
system of review (beyond the actions individuals may take in state liability against the 
United Kingdom) constitutes an abrogation of individuals’ rights guaranteed at EU law.
It is a necessary truth that some element of uncertainty has to be found in legal sys-
tems75 and their application, but that which is found in the current version of the MIB 
agreement is almost inexcusable. It provides the uninitiated (and even lawyers and the 
judiciary) with few guarantees as to the correct application of national and EU law, 
whether the available governance structures are appropriate for their functions, and any 
semblance of the limitations of the actors involved in the rule-making or what currently 
establishes ‘permissible actions’ in national law.
The UDA 2015 requires a purification—the disposal of ineffective, contradictory, 
obsolete, and unenforceable rules, replaced with a clear and compliant structure which 
adheres to domestic and EU laws and principles. These rules should be properly pub-
lished; clear as to their content; consistent with other sources of law (including the 
MVID); identify the application of the rules and their commencement dates; adhere to 
the doctrine of legitimate expectations; and be enforceable.76
72 See Cour d’Arbitrage, Judgment No. 41/2005 of 16 February 2005, a case heard by the Belgian constitutional court.
73 On the issue of the compatibility between national law and EU requirements in motor insurance law, see the comprehensive 
work of Nicholas Bevan in the New Law Journal including: ‘Motor Insurance Law Change’ [2016] NLJ 166, 7703, 5; ‘Putting 
Wrongs to Rights (Pt 2)’ [2016] NLJ 166, 7701, 13; ‘Putting Wrongs to Rights (Pt 1)’ [2016] NLJ 166, 7700, 17; ‘Redress 
Road’ [2016] NLJ 166, 7700, 5; ‘Still Driving Dangerously’ [2016] NLJ 166, 7693, 18; ‘A Call for (More) Reform’ [2015] 
NLJ 165, 7661, 9; ‘No Through Road’ [2015] NLJ 165, 7648, 7; ‘Delaney Sets a New Insurance Route’ [2015] NLJ 165, 
7644, 4; ‘High Impact’ [2014] NLJ 164, 7628, 5; ‘Ignore at Your Peril’ [2014] NLJ 164, 7628, 7; ‘Bad Law’ [2014] NLJ 164, 
7624, 7; ‘UK in Breach Over Uninsured Drivers’ [2014] NLJ 164, 7610, 4; ‘Untraced Drivers’ Scheme is Car Crash’ [2014] 
NLJ 164 7598, 4; ‘On the Right Road (Pt IV)’ [2013] NLJ 163, 193; ‘On the Right Road? (Pt III)’ [2013] NLJ 163, 160; 
‘On the Right Road? (Pt II)’ [2013] NLJ 163, 130; ‘On the Right Road?’ [2013] NLJ 163, 94; ‘Asleep at the Wheel?’ [2013] 
NLJ 163, 7556, 10.
74 See J Marson and K Ferris ‘Delaney and the Motor Vehicle Insurance Directives: Lessons for the Teaching of EU Law’ [2016] 
The Law Teacher 50 [in press]. Available online 25 August 2016. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03069400.2016.1201742>.
75 Legal rules in particular often incorporate an element of unpredictability with the common use of the words including ‘rea-
sonable’ and ‘ordinary’. Typically, the greater the complexity of the code, the increased likelihood there is to be inconsisten-
cies in its content and, thereby, its application.
76 See P Popelier ‘Legal Certainty and the Principles of Proper Law Making’ [2000] European Journal of Law Reform 2, 
321, 339.
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